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Abstract
By using data on Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies, before and after the domestic
implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), this study seeks to understand the role of the institutional theory in the formation of
strategic alliances. Four structural dimensions of strategic alliances formation are identified as
economic distance, the number of alliance participants, cross-national and partner diversity across
different alliance types- marketing, manufacturing, licensing, retail and wholesale services, R&D,
health and medical services, and others. Some alliances from both countries are multi-type which
are categorized as different variables. The trend analysis reveals that TRIPS does not appear to be
impactful for either country which aligns with its staggered domestic implementation in both
countries. Through an analysis involving the Fisher Exact test on a dataset of 307 strategic
alliances, this study finds that China had a statistically significant greater number of alliances with
heterogeneous partners, partners from different industries, manufacturing alliances, all single type
alliances (alliances that had only one type of motivation), and all alliances as compared to India.
Furthermore, India demonstrated a statistically significant preference for multipurpose alliances
revealing a broader trend of China engaging in more single motivation alliances in comparison to
India’s fewer multipurpose strategic alliances with respect to the pharmaceutical industry.
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2. Introduction
In an increasingly complex and uncertain business environment and with the spread of
globalization, firms are increasingly turning to more collaborative solutions, one of which is
strategic alliances. The pharmaceutical industry in particular faces challenges that fundamentally
challenge traditional business models, including patent cliffs, shorter product lifecycle, pay-forperformance, and legal and operational challenges in new markets. Strategic alliances are
emerging as a viable strategy to equip companies to handle these complex situations (Deloitte
2014). The worldwide implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPs), one of the most comprehensive international treaties on intellectual
property rights, changed the face of the global pharmaceutical industry by strengthening patent
protection worldwide (Chadha 2009). The implementation of TRIPS has been qualitatively linked
to an increase in strategic alliances with pharmaceutical firms (Chataway 2007; Saberwal 2009;
Nauriyal 2006; Chaturvedi 2007). Previous literature on the formation of strategic alliances in the
pharmaceutical industry and otherwise has focused on the formation of strategic alliances through
a single theoretical lens— transaction cost, resource dependency, organizational learning, strategic
positioning, and institutional theory and some have tried to use a multi-theoretical lens as well.
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996;
Das and Teng 2000; Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004; Baum and Oliver 1991; Dacin, Oliver and Roy
2007; Gulati 1999; Sharfman and Dean Jr. 1991; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Parmigiani and
Rivera-Santos 2011). A lot of the focus has been placed on partner selection as an important
variable in the formation and operation of alliances (Geringer 1991, Glaister 1996; Arinõ and de
la Torre 1998; Nielsen 2003). A gap in the literature exists in terms of an empirical study that
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explores and analyzes the other structural dimensions of strategic alliances within a theoretical
context.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of four structural dimensions of the formation
of strategic alliances- economic distance, the number of alliance partners, cross-nationality, and
partner diversity from an institutional perspective in the broader setting of the Indian and Chinese
pharmaceutical industry. The study will also explore the impact of TRIPS on the overall trends in
strategic alliances. Given that strategic alliances play a central role for most firms in hightechnology industries like the pharmaceutical industry, managers need to understand the
theoretical underpinnings of the dimensions of the formation of alliances. This would allow them
to better align the structure of the alliances to meet their expectations and motivations.
Understanding the role of strategic alliances in the tremendous development of both the Indian and
Chinese pharmaceutical industries would also be of interest to policymakers not limited to these
countries but also to other developing countries.

The paper will do a two-part analysis; the first section will seek to understand the impact of TRIPS
on the broader trends in Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical strategic alliances by comparing the 5
years preceding and succeeding the domestic implementation of TRIPS which is extrapolated to
the countries’ accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The graphs will more broadly
graph the average number of strategic alliances for both countries from 1990 to 2019. The second
part of the analysis will focus on discerning the difference between the strategic alliances
(categorized by type of alliance) over the four structural dimensions of economic distance, the
number of alliance partners, cross-nationality, and partner diversity by performing Welch Two
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Sample T-tests, Fisher’s Exact test, and Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity
correction.

The key findings from the analysis were focused on partner diversity wherein China had more
heterogeneous partners, partners from different industries, manufacturing alliances, all single type
alliances (alliances that had only one type of motivation), and all alliances as compared to India.
This difference could be attributed to the state-owned enterprises in China and how that changes
business managers’ appetite for collaboration by building their communication networks and
networking skills. This, in conjunction with a desire for technical innovation which is promoted
by learning from other industries, explains why China is engaging in more alliances with diverse
partners than India (Dacin, Hitt and Levitas 1997; Kotabe and Swan 1995; Powell, Koput and
Smith-Doerr 1996). Furthermore, there was also a statistically significant difference in the
proportion of multipurpose alliances by country with India registering more multipurpose alliances
than China. Given that India has 43 fewer recorded strategic alliances than China despite the
dataset capturing Indian data for 6 more years, indicates an overall difference in the presentation
of the pharmaceutical alliance activity in both countries. While China engages in more alliances
that fulfill a single motivation or type, India participates in fewer multipurpose strategic alliances
with respect to the pharmaceutical industry.

3. Background
Section 3.1: Introduction to Strategic Alliances
Strategic alliances can be understood as voluntary collaborations between organizations that
involve product exchange, sharing or co-development, technology development, or the provision
of services that pursue a common set of goals (Gulati 1998). Over the past few decades, there has
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been an increase in businesses participating in these alliances for a variety of reasons including
undertaking joint innovations and organizational learning (Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004),
accessing new markets (Kogut 1991), sharing risks and costs (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996),
and enhancing public visibility and recognition (Baum and Oliver 1991). A strategic alliance is an
important source of growth and competitive advantages (Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath 2002; Kale
and Singh 2009) given its benefits that are as follows (Arrigo 2012): transaction costs, the
enhancement of the competitive position, and the acquisition of knowledge. Firms involved in a
strategic alliance could create value through several sources: scale economies, effective risk
management, cost-efficient market entries, and, especially, learning from partners (Arrigo 2012;
Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath 2002).

Strategic alliances generally allow firms to manage increased uncertainty and complexity in the
business setting as seen in more than 20,000 strategic alliances between 2000 and 2002 that were
designed to manage risk and explore new business opportunities (Martin 2002). These alliances
include ownership agreements (e.g., joint ventures, minority equity alliances), contractual
agreements (e.g., joint research and development, production, and marketing and promotion) or
licensing agreements, and are made with suppliers, distributors (Yoshino and Rangan 1995; Dacin
et al. 2007), industry associations and consortia, government agencies, interest groups, and
research universities and labs (Lin and Darnall 2015). A strategic alliance has three important
characteristics. Firstly, after the formation of the alliance, the parent firms should retain their
independence. The arrangement consists of ongoing mutual interdependence, in which one party
is vulnerable to another whose behavior is not under the control of the first firm. In essence, each
firm needs the other to achieve its individual goals (Parkhe 1993). Thirdly, there is an element of
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uncertainty concerning the motives and actions of the other party, given the independence
maintained by each firm (Powell 1996).

Over the past decades, in the background of the new challenges arising in the aftermath of market
globalization, the significance of strategic alliances has substantially increased (Kesič 2009). By
allowing firms to access critical resources that allow gaining and maintaining competitive
advantages, alliances are critical to a firm’s survival (Cobeña, Gallego, and Casanueva 2017). An
increasing number of firms are adopting cooperative strategies because they lack the internal
resources necessary for the preservation of their competitive position in the industry. Competition
has shifted from between individual firms to between alliance networks (Brondoni 2010). By
collaborating, forms can bridge internal weaknesses and cope with complex external market
conditions. Cooperative strategies employed by firms have a wide range of solutions including
equity and non-equity alliances (Brondoni 2003). Walter and Barney identified eight drivers that
motivate firms to enter into a strategic alliance of any kind: exploiting economies of scale, learning
from competitors, managing risks and sharing costs, low-cost entry into a new market, low-cost
entry into new industries, and new industry segments, low-cost exit from industries and industry
segments, managing uncertainty and facilitating tacit collusion (1990).

Section 3.2: Introduction to Institutional Theory
According to Richard, the institutional theory is "a widely accepted theoretical posture that
emphasizes productivity, ethics, and legitimacy" (2008). Institutional theory along with others has
been used to consider alliance formation more generally. Typically, most studies have viewed their
emergence through a single theoretical lens, with some of the main theories including transaction
cost theory (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996), resource-based
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perspective (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Das and Teng 2000; Grant and Baden-Fuller
2004, institutional theory (Baum and Oliver 1991; Dacin, Oliver and Roy 2007; Gulati 1999;
Sharfman and Dean Jr. 1991). On the other hand, others have argued that multiple theoretical
perspectives would more appropriately reveal firms’ motivations to engage in various
organizational relationships (Barringer and Harrison 2000; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011).

The institutional theory presents that rules, norms, and values put pressure on firms within a
common setting to adopt similar practices and structures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This is
done to gain social legitimacy, enhance survival prospects and conform to institutional rules,
regulations, norms, and expectations (Dacin 1997; Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Meyer and
Rowan 1977). This pressure can be external: originating from other organizations that firms are
dependent on, as well as from the cultural expectations in which they function. Internal sources of
pressure include professional norms that encourage firms within the same industry to behave
similarly to appear legitimate in the eyes of their competitors, and to mimic other organizations
that they perceive as being more successful (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

This article proposes that the choice of strategic alliance structure, similar to organizational
structure, can be viewed as a response to both a firm's external environment and its internal
organizational practices and routines (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977). From
an institutional perspective, economic rationales such as achievement of organizational efficiency
and competitiveness are thought of as secondary concerns (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Martinez
and Dacin 1999). It can be said that firms have a limited array of strategic actions from which to
make decisions. Their choices are made from a defined set of legitimate options as determined by
economic opportunity, resources, and institutional forces within an industry and a country or
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region, given their common goal of survival and success (Ahlstrom and Bruton 2001, Hoffman
1999). Firms, thus, operate within frameworks of norms, values, and rules of exchange that define
appropriate economic behavior and influence strategic choices (Fligstein 1996). Majority of
market activity happens existence of institutions embedded in economic, political, and cultural
arrangements (Dacin, Goodstein and Scott 2002, North 1990). Institutions can be understood as
shared understandings or rules of conduct that are reflected in laws, rules, governance mechanisms,
and capital markets (North 1990). These arrangements then help to define observed patterns of
market exchange (Fligstein 1996). Therefore, institutional arrangements, in terms of government
legislation, the nature of property rights, the presence or absence of professional and commercial
norms of behavior, or more can have a deterministic impact on the options available for acceptable
action (Hitt, Ahlstrom, Dacin, Levitas and Svobodina 2004).

It is also notable and relevant that governments create institutional arrangements that promote and
facilitate effective macroeconomic policies, liberalize trade and finance, protect private property
rights, and privatize the ownership of state enterprises (Rondinelli and Behrman 2000). This paper
proposes using China and India as the setting to understand how institutional theory may impact
the structural dimensions in the formation of strategic alliances.

Since Independence in India in 1947, and Liberation in China in 1949, the comparative economic
performance of the two Asian giants have drawn intense interest. China aimed to grow under
revolutionary socialism directed by the communist party while India focused on a socialistic
pattern as a parliamentary democracy (Saith 2008). India and China do have some cultural values
in common, but there are also differences between the two countries. A lack of recognition of these
differences may lead to making erroneous inferences. For instance, research suggests that both
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India and China are collectivistic, but Indian collectivism goes hand in hand with individualism
(Sinha & Kanungo 1997). These differences have a significant impact on the formation of strategic
alliances according to the institutional theory. Economic growth in China has been driven by public
sector companies while the private sector has played an important role in India. The behavior of
Chinese firms appears to be less conventional than that of their Indian counterparts. In terms of
outward foreign direct investment, whereas cultural distance and political risk discourage Indian
firms, these factors do not seem to affect Chinese firms’ location decisions (Quer, Claver, and
Rienda 2017). Kumar and Worm presented a systematic overview of the institutional differences
between India and China across three dimensions- regulatory, normative, and cognitive. Within
the regulatory dimension, there is a high level of regulatory hurdles in India and China but the later
can be navigated due to a mutually accommodating relationship between the central government
and local provinces. As for the encouragement of foreign investment, the stated policy is to
encourage foreign investment, but there is often a gap between intention and implementation in
India. In China, on the other hand, a rhetorical commitment toward foreign investment was
reinforced by concrete policy measures designed to strengthen the attractiveness of China. Within
the normative dimension, India follows an analytical mode of thinking whereas China follows a
holistic mode of thinking. Indian behavioral patterns can be understood as individualistic and
collectivistic as compared to the dominance of collectivism in China. Within the cognitive
dimension, India has a historically unfavorable attitude towards business activity whereas China
has been ideologically favorable which may not have always translated itself into a positive
attitude towards merchants. Lastly, in terms of attitude toward foreign investment, India is more
unfavorable given its colonial legacy while China is traditionally ambivalent with a lower level of
fear of foreign investors now (2004).
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To understand the impact of these institutional differences on strategic alliances in India and China,
this paper will focus on four structural dimensions of strategic alliances- partner diversity,
economic distance, cross-national, and the number of partners in an alliance.

Partner diversity
Partner diversity refers to organizational participation from multiple industries and sectors (Kotabe
and Swan 1995; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996) such as firms, universities, research
laboratories, suppliers, and customers (Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996), in addition to
regulators and NGOs. Joining hands with diverse partners can be advantageous in that it increases
the opportunities for variability among partnering firms’ complementary capabilities. It may also
boost innovation outcomes since the origin of innovation often lies outside the base industry
(Kotabe and Swan 1995; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996).

These partnerships can range from participants from different sectors or industries. This paper will
be focusing on the type of diverse partnerships that involve multiple firms that operate in a variety
of industries, given the history of alliances in pharmaceutical industries in these countries.
Heterogeneous partnerships combine the complementary assets of diverse members towards
innovation and new market entry (Sakakibara 1997). Given the lack of overlap among the
competencies of alliance partners, by coming together they can enhance their innovative
productivity (Sakakibara 1997; Teece 1992). However, several authors have stressed inter-partner
diversity as the most important cause of alliance failure (Adler and Graham 1989, Harrigan
1988, Parkhe 1991). Thus, we understand that increasing partner diversity, that is, forming a
strategic alliance with heterogeneous partners is a high-reward high-risk strategic option.
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Cross-National
Cross-national alliances can be understood as alliances between two or more legally independent
firms situated in different countries (Kumar and Andersen 2000). The development of shared
values and norms among culturally divergent alliance partners is crucial for alliance success
(Geringer and Herbert 1989; Lyles and Salk 1996). Different expectations among alliance partners
originating from differences in strategic objectives, culture, organizational practices, or trust may
lead to two outcomes: opportunistic behavior on the part of alliance partners or difficulty achieving
inter-organizational coordination. The challenges in cross‐national alliances are wide-ranging,
from lack of trust (Das and Teng 1998; Ring and Van de Ven 1994), deceit and opportunism (Das
2005), strategic incompatibility (Ariño and De La Torre 1998), poor organizational integration
(Gulati and Singh 1998) ineffective management of internal tensions (Das and Teng 2000) to
cultural distance (Lane and Beamish 1990).

Number of Alliance Partners
Most of the literature on international strategic alliances has focused on those formed between two
firms, with the dominant structure involving only two-partner firms. However, many firms enter
alliances with three or more firms. This could be because as the number of parent firms engaged
in an international alliance increases, individual roles become more complex, which results in
higher failure rates (Franko 1971). However, Park and Russo
found empirical evidence that the more partners in a joint venture, the less likely it was to fail
contrary to their hypothesis and suggested that experience somehow acts indirectly to add value to
joint ventures with numerous parties (1996). Hu and Chen discovered that the relationship between
alliance performance and the number of partners was curvilinear; increasing the number of
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partners, up to five firms, is positively associated with alliance performance (1996). However,
proceeding research also focused on the costs of having numerous partners (Esteban 2007). An
increased number of partners augments coordination and motivation costs. Each new partner
requires additional effort increasing the total amount of relational investment needed to make the
alliance work. Having more partners also makes it more challenging to reach a consensus.
Additionally, it reduces profitable opportunities since it is difficult to
define new projects that satisfy the requirements of all the partners. Another factor limiting the
value of these alliances is that each new partner makes it more difficult to put the reciprocity
mechanism into practice (Parkhe 1993) Hence, alliances with more partners than two are seen as
less stable, less successful, and not as long-lasting as dyadic agreements (Oxley 1997; Park and
Russo 1996).

Economic Distance
Economic distance can be defined as a measure of economic disparity between two countries
(Ghemawat 2001). The economic distance between two countries affects dimensions such as
factor costs including wages and technological capability, which are significant elements in
potential conflicts, the process, and the performance of international alliances (Tsang and Yip
2007).
Johnson and Tellis suggested that there are numerous advantages for a multinational enterprise to
engage with host countries that are close in economic distance from their home country (2008).
First, market knowledge is more easily transferable between two countries and firms. Second, the
similar infrastructure between the countries leads to increased operational efficiencies and lower
costs. Third, given that firms develop knowledge-based competencies and resources related to their
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markets, these can be best leveraged in countries that are similar in economic development because
of greater applicability (Madhok 1997). Furthermore, Dunning argued that there is a reduced
likelihood of success for firms entering countries that are more economically different from their
home country given the need to adjust to the new market condition. Thus, a greater economic
distance between partners seems to be negatively associated with success, especially in foreign
direct investment (1998). In an empirical study focusing on international strategic alliances,
Shijaku, Larraza-Kintana, and Urtasun-Alonso found that firms performing below aspirations
exhibit more economically distant international strategic alliances, while those performing above
aspirations exhibit fewer distant international strategic alliances (2020).

Section 3.3: Strategic Alliances in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Given the rising significance of the strategic alliance, there have been numerous studies exploring
the value of the strategic alliance in the pharmaceutical industry. Hess and Rothaerme investigate
specific resource combinations along the value chain, focusing on the recruitment and retention of
star scientists, and strategic alliances, elements that are critical to combining resources for
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry (2011). Mittra finds that the perception of the innovation
deficit serves as an inducement to large pharmaceutical firms to combine M&A activities, strategic
alliances, and licensing deals alongside conventional in-house R&D to capture both incremental
innovations and new disruptive technologies (2007). McCutchen Jr and Swamidass find that
licensors are motivated by market access, more so in the case of larger firms, and licensees are
motivated by the desire to improve their competitive position (2004). Nguyen and Tran asserted
that firms with low-mid capableness and management have more advantages than companies with
high capableness after they form a partnership by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), and
then Grey Forecasting Model GM (I, I) approach in the Vietnam pharmaceutical industry (2018).
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Meanwhile, Hsu did a comparative study of the international strategic alliance network between
the Chinese and American pharmaceutical industry to understand the different motivations of
alliance and how it affects partner selection (2011). The American pharmaceutical industry has
also been studied in relation to strategic group formation and performance over the period 1963–
1982 with only performance differences in terms of market share and no profitability differences
detected between strategic groups (Cool and Schendel 1987). Ohba and Figueiredo examined the
entry and exit composition of innovative capabilities of 25 pharmaceutical companies involved in
strategic alliances and finds that big-pharma companies have obtained the largest amount of
innovative technological capabilities from the strategic alliances (2007). While some (Lin and
Darling 1999) have analyzed the formation of strategic alliances in the pharmaceutical industry,
others have looked at the drivers of alliance terminations (Dan 2016). Other studies have examined
the impact of strategic alliance partner characteristics, partner complementarity, partner
commitment, and partner compatibility on a firm’s innovation (Abuzaid 2014) and determinants
of trust in such alliances and their impact on performance (Jennings, Artz, Gillin, and
Christodouloy 2000; Xue, Xingmeng, Lan and Geng 2008). There also have been studies looking
at contracts (Yoon, Rosales, and Talluri 2018) and transactions associated with strategic alliances
(Jambulingam and Saxton 2021). Xu and Cavusgil probe how different R&D alliance portfolio
configuration strategies affect firms' ability to develop knowledge breadth and knowledge depth
(2019).
However, there are very few studies studying strategic alliances as a function of the TRIPS act
which has arguably been one of the biggest catalysts of change in the industry globally. Angeli
examined patenting and alliance activity post TRIPS and empirically showed that one, innovation
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outcomes increased sharply, and second, cross-border alliances have proved significantly more
successful at enhancing innovative capability (2014).

Section 3.3.1 History of TRIPS
The origin and the implementation of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) had a transformative impact on the global pharmaceutical industry.
However, the introduction of the Intellectual Property Agenda during the Uruguay Round of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 evoked early fears and concerns for the
Indian Pharmaceutical industry (Nair 2008). Supporters of the legislation asserted that creating an
incentive to innovate by establishing an exclusive right to sell through privatizing IP would result
in stronger patents that would benefit developing economies in many ways. (Ryan 1998; Maskus
2000). Most notable was Lincoln (1905 [1859]), who stated that ‘the patent system added the fuel
of interest to the fire of genius, an argument that has continued to inform the US perspective on IP
protection both domestically and internationally, particularly during the TRIPs negotiations, (Khan
and Sokoloff 2001). Another benefit of patents was to support economic development through
their influence on technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) and licensing. (Chang
2001; Kumar 2003; Maskus and Fink 2005). There was expected to be an increase in international
licensing of technology due to the lowered occurrence of imitation and therefore reduced
transaction costs (Maskus and Fink 2005). In the mid-1990s, a highly cited and influential survey
revealed that for high-technology industries the strength of the IP protection has been a major
determinant of US corporations’ willingness to invest in joint ventures (Mansfield 1994). During
the late 1990s and early 2000s, the EU and the USA pressurized many developing countries by
asserting that they would lose FDI if they provided flexibilities in patent law, like by legislating
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for compulsory licenses (D’Adesky 2004). However, there was conflicting evidence of what
determined FDI in developing countries. Many countries including Brazil and Thailand in the
1970s and 1980s, and China more recently have received considerable quantities of FDI even with
low levels of IP protection. Brazil and Italy had already attracted sizable FDI in the pharmaceutical
industry without product patent protection (Correa 2000; Kumar 2003). Moreover, the impact of
patent protection on FDI regarding technology transfer is unclear. With greater protection, firms
may switch to other forms of market entry such as licensing (Rai 2008), after which FDI may not
necessarily increase. Others posited a weaker link between stronger IP rights and foreign direct
investment and foreign collaborations with Indian firms, citing other necessary conditions
including a good ‘business climate,’ easy access to dependable infrastructure, and the ability to
conduct business transactions transparently and efficiently. These conditions are not connected
with TRIPS and thus the impact of TRIPS on either the commercial strategies of foreign companies
or their strategic alliances with Indian companies is not significant (Ramani 2005).

On the other hand, the TRIPs Agreement attracted persistent criticism, especially leading up to its
final implementation in most developing countries in 2005, with many questions being asked about
the learning benefits of extensive patent protection for developing countries (Chang 2001;
Bhagwati 2002). Technological learning plays an important role in developing countries that have
emphasized the absorption and incremental improvement of pre-existing technologies (Viotti
2001). Learning has been encouraged by weak IP protection in East Asia (Kumar 2003). Improving
IP protection by preventing learning through imitation can have negative effects on R&D because
it is improbable that it would provide an impetus to domestic innovation if few innovative
capabilities were present (Lall 2003).
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Given these potential negative consequences, the domestic industry was initially strongly opposed
to India joining a global agreement on IP (Ramanna 2004). For instance, Hamied (1988) argued
that ‘patent protection will cripple R&D’. There was an expected consequence on the consumer in
terms of increased prices and greater focus of domestic firms on developing markets, neglecting
indigenous demand (Patel 1992). A broader impact was anticipated with Frederick, Kapczynski,
and Srinivasan claiming that ‘Indian generic manufactures are too crucial for India, and for the
world, to be allowed by a misguided patent law to be wiped out (2005). On the other hand, some
had faith in the industry’s adaptative capabilities (Lall 2003) and some of the larger Indian
pharmaceutical firms, starting with Delhi-based Ranbaxy (Hamied 1988), became supporters of
the proposed change in patent law. This confidence was backed by analysts who predicted loss of
welfare and wealth as an aftermath of the implementation of TRIPS in developing countries but
had a more positive take on India, given that it had developed innovation capacities for the
development of pharmaceutical processes. Lall and Albaladej argued that the Indian
pharmaceutical industry might have developed to the point that stronger IPRS would induce
greater innovation by local firms which would have to be set off against the closure of other firms
(2002). Smith agreed that TRIPS need not lead to adverse consequences for Indian companies.
India could emerge as one of the first developing countries to produce cutting-edge technology in
the industry (2000).

All agreements of WTO, including TRIPS, came into force on 1 January 1995; however, Article
65.2 of TRIPS permitted developing countries, a transition period of five years to implement the
provisions of TRIPS (Chaudhuri 2005), which India took advantage of (Chadha 2009). In 2005,
the product patent regime was reintroduced in India when it amended the Patent Act to comply
with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on TRIPS, which set global minimum
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standards for the protection of intellectual property. The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) deals with patents and with other forms of IPRs, such as
copyright, trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, and confidential information.
The objectives of TRIPS are enshrined as the “promotion of technological innovation and transfer
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights
and obligations” (Nair 2008). All WTO members had to comply with the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement which required the introduction of both product patents for pharmaceuticals and a
patent-protection period of at least 20 years. As a result, The Indian pharmaceutical industry faced
new challenges, primarily because of the assumption that the introduction of pharmaceutical
product patents would hamper the Indian pharmaceutical industry’s growth. Under the product
patent regime, pharmaceutical firms can no longer manufacture by reverse-engineering or export
drugs with product patents in effect, which so far had been the key strategy behind India’s
pharmaceutical success (Kamiike 2020).

Individual countries were free to have their own patents laws before the creation of the World
Trade Organization in 1995. In the absence of legislation, India took advantage of this lacuna and
replaced the British Patents and Designs Act, 1911 with the Patents Act, 1970 in 1972. Notably,
this new law recognized only process patents and did not offer patent protection in drugs (and
food). This combined with a few other policies brought about significant structural changes and
growth in the pharmaceutical industry in India and led to the emergence of India as a major player
in the global pharmaceutical industry (Chaudhuri 2005). From 1970 to 1995, the share of the
national sector of the pharmaceutical industry grew from 15% to nearly 18% approximately. In the
process, India achieved self-sufficiency in the manufacture of medicines and became a
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substantially large manufacturer and exporter of bulk drugs/ active ingredients. As a net exporter
of pharmaceuticals, India occupied the third-largest position in terms of volumes and the
fourteenth largest in terms of value (Nair 2008). Given the expansion of the industry, it had come
to be known as the ‘pharmacy of the developing world’ (Horner 2014). Notably, Indian firms did
not seek foreign technical assistance to reverse-engineer the foreign patented drugs and were able
to imitate the patented drugs by employing the information provided in the patent title, given their
well-developed chemical infrastructure, and process skills (Fink 2000).

On the other hand, the first Chinese Patent Law was enacted on 1 April 1985 which included only
patent protection that would be valid for 15 years. The first amendment of the Chinese Patent Law
came into effect on 1 January 1993. This amendment allowed for product patent protection to be
granted to pharmaceutical compounds to be used as active ingredients. The term of patent
protection was extended to 20 years. The 1993 China Patent Law Amendment was generally
equivalent to the TRIPS standard introduced in 1995. Before 1993, the Chinese pharmaceutical
industry was characterized by a low degree of concentration: there were many firms with small
market shares and a low level of research and development (Li 2008).

Section 3.3.2 The Impact of TRIPS
However, contrary to expectations, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has flourished in the postTRIPS period with most of the literature in the field focusing on the impact of TRIPS on research
and innovation, and foreign direct investment. This has been a consequence of a multitude of
strategies adopted by Indian firms in the wake of the new intellectual property rights. Firstly, there
has been an increase in R&D activities to enable them to make a transition from being drug
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“imitators” to drug “innovators” (Sunil 2014). According to Kamiike, TRIPS Agreement has not
only increased R&D expenditures in the Indian pharmaceutical industry but also changed its R&D
orientation. The new R&D focus is on novel drug delivery systems (NDDS), new drug
development research (NDDR), and R&D for biopharmaceuticals (2020). Furthermore, Indian
firms started undertaking contract research, including outsourced clinical trials. They also started
collaborating in joint R&D and product and process development to synergize their knowledge
base and effectively exploit available human resources and infrastructure (Sunil 2014).

Secondly, Kamiike mentions that globalization of the pharmaceutical industry occurred because
of the TRIPS act wherein there was an expansion of outsourcing business in India since the law
reduced the risk to foreign companies of outsourcing to Indian companies (2020). Sunil highlights
that Indian firms started engaging in deals with multinationals to produce generic and patented
drugs (2014).

Third, Indian pharmaceutical companies also began pursuing strategic collaborations with global
pharmaceutical companies (Kamiike 2020). The industry was undergoing a consolidation phase
through indigenous mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances (Sunil 2014). Abrol also
suggests that because of the introduction of strong IPRs, pharmaceutical multinationals are now
advantageously placed to control knowledge diffusion and integrate the local capabilities of a
developing country like India into their own myopic and narrowly benefiting innovation strategies
(2004). Chaudhari states that the manufacturing and importing behavior of pharmaceutical
multinationals since the 1990s bore a close resemblance to that before the 1970s. Manufacturing
investments have decreased while imports of high-priced finished formulations are expanding
rapidly. While these firms extended their interest to the patented markets, they also expanded
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vigorously in the generic segments. In doing so, they focused on organic and inorganic growth,
through mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliances with Indian generic companies (2012).
The impact of TRIPs on strategic alliances formed by Indian pharmaceutical firms in the post
TRIPS period has so far only been studied qualitatively and is rather contradictory, lacking
empirical evidence. Chataway asserts that there have been big increases in strategic alliances
between big pharmaceutical firms and biomedically strong universities in the pharmaceutical
industry globally and within India post TRIPS (2007). However, Abrol, Prajapati, and Singh claim
that India did not see much increase in strategic alliances as compared to the global
biopharmaceutical and biotechnology firms (2011). In her survey of international pharmaceutical
public-private partnerships tackling neglected diseases, Saberwal showed that only eight Indian
companies were involved including Gland Pharma, GVK Bio, Odyssey (US entity), and Advinus
Therapetuics, Bharat Biotech, Serum Institute, Stride, Shantha Biotech (2009). Nauriyal
anticipates that instead of competing with global pharmaceutical firms, Indian firms would try to
form strategic alliances with them to reduce the degree of uncertainty. In the medium term, firms
may seek an alliance with global firms to conduct clinical trials given that it would be difficult for
them to do it independently due to resource constraints (2006). Chaturvedi echoes this rationale
by stating that the difficulty in commercializing their discoveries on an international basis alone
will prompt Indian firms to initiate licensing deals and strategic alliances with international
companies. Cipla, Torrent, Sun, Lupin, Zydus, and Dabur are some examples of firms that have
expanded their networks through strategic alliances (2007).

In stark contrast, there have been fewer studies studying the impact of TRIPS on the Chinese
pharmaceutical industry. A reason for that may be because the domestic implementation of TRIPS
didn’t have the same impact in China that it did in India given how similar the 1993 Chinese patent
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law amendment was to TRIPS. In terms of R&D investment, little evidence has been found that a
higher standard of patent protection after the 1993 Patent Law Amendment has stimulated Chinese
domestic R&D activities. Indian R&D expenditure allocated to pharmaceuticals is substantially
higher than in China (Li 2008). Chinese domestic pharmaceutical industries spent on average only
0.5 percent to 3.0 percent of their turnover on R&D (Pefile et al 2005). To put it in perspective,
the total R&D expenditure for Chinese-owned pharmaceuticals was even less than that of a single
major Western multinational counterpart. Moreover, most of this R&D expenditure was used for
marketing and commercialization. As a result, approximately 97 percent of about 3,000 Chineseowned pharmaceuticals produced generic drug versions of foreign brands (Li 2008).

4. Methods and Materials
Section 4.1 Data Selection and Collection
To begin with the data selection process, the data collection was bifurcated into two sections each
for the Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical strategic alliances – before and after the implementation
of TRIPS. The date of implementation of TRIPS was measured as the countries’ date of accession
to WTO to capture the strategic alliances that may have been formed in the anticipation of the
TRIPS. The date of accession to WTO was chosen since the domestic implementation of TRIPS
was a necessary condition for members of WTO. India became a member of WTO on 1 January
1995 and China did the same on 11 December 2001 (World Trade Organization). Since the
database did not have any recorded strategic alliances for India before 1990, the data collected
from before the implementation of TRIPS was limited to a period of 5 years for both countries.
The data collected for the after TRIPS period was collected till 2019 for both countries. Data from
December 2019 was excluded to avoid any mitigating effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic
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since the first case was detected in late December 2019 in China (Zimmer, Mueller, and Buckley
2021). This resulted in a total sample of 307 strategic alliances, with 137 Indian alliances and 170
Chinese alliances.

This data has been collected from the SDC Platinum database, which collects information about
global mergers and acquisitions, venture capital, corporate restructuring, corporate governance,
new issue, security trading, and global finance. It is one of the most accurate and comprehensive
databases available on strategic alliances. On the database, the search of the strategic alliance was
further filtered by industry (SIC codes including 2833, 2834, 2835, and 2836), nation (at least one
participant nation in the alliance had to belong to the country for which data was being collected)
and completion (only completed alliances were recorded).

Section 4.2 Data measurement
Cross-national alliances
In terms of measurement of these variables, for cross-national or domestic alliances, foreign
participants were identified through the participant nations for each alliance. A dummy variable
with the value “1” was created if the alliance participants belonged to different countries (to
represent cross-national alliance) and “0” if the alliance participants belonged to the same country
(to represent domestic alliance).
Economic distance
For economic distance, each participant nation was classified as a developing country, an economy
in transition, or a developed country based on the United Nations criteria. The following values
were assigned to each category: developing countries were coded as “0”, economies in transition
were coded as “1” and developed countries were coded as “2”. Then the difference in the values
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assigned to the participants was taken as the measure of economic distance. In the case of alliances
with three or more partners, the difference between the two farthest apart was recorded as the
measure of economic distance.
Number of Alliance Partners
For the variable number of partners per alliance, the number of partners per alliance for each
alliance was recorded by the number of participants as indicated by the database.
Partner diversity
Alliances that included participants from within the pharmaceutical industry, that is, participants
with one of the following SIC codes- 2833, 2834, 2835, and 2836- were said to have homogenous
partners and coded as “1”. Alliances that included even one participant firm with a different SIC
code were understood to have heterogeneous partners and coded as “0”.

Section 4.3 Analytical Methods
To observe the impact of only institutional factors on the four dimensions of strategic alliance
formation, the alliances in both countries were sorted by alliance type which is indicative of the
motivation of the analysis. The alliances for both countries were categorized into main groups
based on the grouping system followed by the SDC Platinum database from where the data was
sourced. All single type alliances were categorized as follows: manufacturing, marketing,
licensing, R&D, health and medical services, retail and wholesale services, and other and single
type alliances. Other here includes alliances for the purposes of supply services, funding services,
and NEC services. Single type alliances are defined as the sum of all single type all alliancesmarketing, manufacturing, licensing, research and development, health and medical services, retail
and wholesale services, and other alliances. Two type alliances refer to all alliances that belong to
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two type categories. Three type alliances refer to all alliances that belong to three type categories.
Mix type alliances refer to all alliances that belong to more than three type categories. Multiple
type alliances refer to all alliances that have more than one type and are the sum of two type
alliances, three type alliances, and mix type alliances. All alliances refer to the total number of
alliances for each country regardless of type categories- 137 Indian strategic alliances and 170
Chinese strategic alliances.

To begin with, the different alliance types were graphed over the entire duration for both countries
to observe broader trends in strategic alliances. The second part of the analysis focused on
detecting differences in the means of the four dimensions for each structural dimension. Economic
distance and number of alliance partners were coded as continuous variables and were analyzed
using the Welch Two-Sample t-test in R. Cross-national and partner diversity were coded as binary
variables and were analyzed using the Fisher Exact Test, given their smaller sample size in R. The
difference in the proportion of the single type and multiple type alliances by country was also
tested using the Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction.

5. Results

Section 5.1 Broader Trends in Strategic Alliances
The trend analysis was segregated based on alliance type categories – manufacturing, licensing,
marketing, research and development, health and medical services, retail and wholesale services
alliances, and other alliances as determined by the database. Other alliances” here include alliance
types including funding services, hospital, and clinical services, services (NEC), and the software
category others. The alliances in the database belonged to either one of those categories or more
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than one category. The trend analysis does not distinguish whether the category alliances are single
type alliances or belong to multiple categories, given the limitations of the data. There are several
years when different single type alliances don’t have strategic alliances for either or both countries
which would make a trend analysis challenging.

The graphs track the 3-year rolling window averages of the number of deals in each category from
1990 to 2019. This section will seek to understand if and how the domestic implementation of
TRIPS in each country may have impacted the trend of strategic alliances across different
categories. The impact of TRIPS is extrapolated by the accession of India to WTO on 1 January
1995 in India and 11 December 2001 for China. The analysis contains data for 5 years before they
accede to WTO which was 1 January 1990 to 31 December 1994 from India and 11 December
1996 to 10 December 2001 for China. Hence, 1993-95 is the first point to include transactions that
may have been impacted by TRIPS in India. While for China, 1999-01 is the first point to include
transactions that may have been impacted by TRIPS in India.

Figure 1 graphs the average number of marketing strategic alliances of the Indian and Chinese
pharmaceutical industries from 1990 to 2019. For both countries, in the periods proceeding with
the domestic implementation of TRIPs, there appears to be a decrease in the number of marketing
alliances. India seems to engage in a higher number of manufacturing strategic alliances than
China, except in the period when after India has implemented TRIPS but China hasn’t. Overall,
the movement of marketing alliances for the two countries seems to mirror each other over the 3
decades.
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Figure 1: Average number of Indian and Chinese manufacturing alliances from 1990 to 2019

The trend of the average number of licensing strategic alliances in the Indian and Chinese
pharmaceutical industry from 1990 to 2019 is presented in figure 2. Broadly speaking, both India
and China appear to be less popular settings for licensing deals with China recording a steady low
number of deals over the years whereas India appears to be more volatile, showing three periods
of enthusiastic activity with no deals in the periods in between. As for the impact of TRIPS, the
sample is too small for a confident prediction; it can be said that TRIPS may be factored into the
decrease in the number of licensing deals around that period for each country.
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Figure 2: Average number of Indian and Chinese licensing alliances from 1990 to 2019

Figure 3 graphs the average number of marketing strategic alliances between the Indian and
Chinese pharmaceutical industries from 1990 to 2019. Overall, India seems to be the more
attractive option for marketing alliances over the entire period, recording a greater number of
marketing alliances over the 3-decade period than China. However, compared to historical levels,
India has shown a decline in the average number of deals. Since the number of deals in China was
decreasing before the implementation of TRIPS, all that can be said is that TRIPS didn’t lead to
an increase in the average number of licensing strategic alliances in China. For India, it seemed to
have a negative impact.
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Figure 3: Average number of Indian and Chinese marketing alliances from 1990 to 2019

The trend of the average number of research and development strategic alliances in the Indian and
Chinese pharmaceutical industries from 1990 to 2019 is presented in figure 4. The symmetry in
the movement of research and development strategic alliances presents strongly over the decades,
with China being slightly more dominant for a great period. Post-TRIPS both countries move in
the opposite direction, with Indian research and development alliances decreasing post-2005 and
Chinese research and development alliances increasing post-2001.
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Figure 4: Average number of Indian and Chinese research and development alliances from 1990
to 2019

Figure 5 graphs the average number of health and medical services strategic alliances of the Indian
and Chinese pharmaceutical industries from 1990 to 2019. Just as with research and development
alliances, the similarity in the average number of health and medical services strategic alliances
for both countries is evident, with India being slightly more dominant for the first half of the period
and China for the latter half. Post TRIPS for both countries, there is a brief lull in deals after which
they steadily start increasing, climbing to their highest point together post 2016.
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Figure 5: Average number of Indian and Chinese health and medical services alliances from
1990 to 2019

The trend of the average number of Chinese retail and wholesale services strategic alliances in the
Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical industry from 1990 to 2019 is presented in figure 6. Broadly
speaking, the average number of retail and wholesale services strategic alliances seems to be quite
volatile for both India and China. Given this volatility, it is harder to understand TRIPS’ impact
post-implementation within these industries.
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Figure 6: Average number of Indian and Chinese retail and wholesale services alliances from
1990 to 2019
Section 5.2 Analysis
To investigate and isolate the impact of the institutional differences in strategic alliances belonging
to the two countries, the alliances were categorized by their type which is an indicator of the
motivation behind the formation of the alliance (Chih-Sheng 2011). It may be possible that the
strategic alliance formation is differ by the type of alliances. Given that the dataset contained
alliances that had only one type like marketing only and alliances that had multiple types like both
marketing and manufacturing, this paper distinguishes between single type alliances and multiple
type alliances. “Marketing alliances”, “manufacturing alliances”, “licensing alliances”, “research
and development alliances”, “retail and wholesale services alliances”, “health and medical services
alliances”, and “other alliances” are defined as single type alliances for all proceeding analysis.
The definition of which alliances belonged to which single type of category or multiple type
category is extracted directly from the software. “Other alliances” here include alliance types
including funding services, hospital, and clinical services, services (NEC), and the software
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category “others”. “Single type alliances” here is defined as the sum of all single type all alliancesmarketing, manufacturing, licensing, research and development, health and medical services, retail
and wholesale services, and other alliances. The variable “Two type alliances” refers to all
alliances that belong to two type categories. The variable “Three type alliances” refers to all
alliances that belong to three type categories. “Mix type alliances” refers to all alliances that belong
to more than three type categories. “Multiple type alliances” refers to all alliances that have more
than one type and are the sum of two type alliances, three type alliances, and mix type alliances.
“All alliances” refers to the total number of alliances for each country regardless of type categories137 Indian strategic alliances and 170 Chinese strategic alliances.

These variables were compared for Indian and Chinese strategic alliances to probe for differences
across four structural dimensions of strategic alliance formation- economic distance, number of
alliance participants, cross-national, and partner diversity. Welch Two-sample T-tests were used
for analyzing economic distance and number of alliance participants, given that they are recorded
in the dataset as continuous variables. On the other hand, Fisher’s Exact test was used to analyze
cross-national and partner diversity given their small sample size as well as their nature as binary
variables. Given the categorization of Indian and Chinese strategic alliances into the single type
and multiple type alliances, Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction was used
to probe for a difference in the frequency of all single type and multiple type alliances by country.

An analysis of the differences in economic distance between Indian and Chinese strategic alliances
was done using the Welch Two-sample T-tests as presented in Table 1. None of the variables
yielded statistically significant results, indicating that there is no measurable difference in the
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economic distance between Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical strategic alliances. In Table 1, the
average economic distance is compared for all single type alliances which include “marketing
alliances”, “manufacturing alliances”, “licensing alliances”, “research and development alliances”,
“retail and wholesale services alliances”, “health and medical services alliances”, “other
alliances”, “single type alliances”. The table also includes compares the average economic distance
for all multiple type alliances- “two type alliances”, “three type alliances”, “mix type alliances”,
“multiple alliances”- and “all alliances” for both India and China. However, the sample size for
marketing alliances and other alliances was too small to conduct a t-test.

The average economic distance for all alliances for both India and China were 1.358491 and
1.41584 respectively. The average economic distance for all single alliances and all multiple
alliances was also similar for both countries.

Table 1: Welch Two Sample T-test analyzing alliance type by the variable “Economic Distance”
Economic Distance
Alliance Type
India
China
T (Welch Two p-value
Sample t-test)
Marketing alliances*
1
2
NA
NA
n
2
1
(% of total)
(1.50%)
(0.60%)
Licensing alliances
1.33
1.6
0.343
0.7513
n
3
5
(% of total)
(2.26%)
(2.98%)
Manufacturing alliances
1.071429
1.378378
1.2828
0.2048
n
28**
37**
(% of total)
(21.05%)
(22.02%)
R&D alliances
1.818182
1.565217
-1
0.3263
n
11
23
(% of total)
(8.27%)
(13.69%)
Retail and Wholesale
2.000000
1.333333
-1
0.4226
Services alliances
n
3
3**
(% of total)
(2.26%)
(1.79%)
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Health and Medical Services
alliances
n
(% of total)
Other alliances*
n
(% of total)
Single type alliances
n
(% of total)
Two type alliances
n
(% of total)
Three type alliances
n
(% of total)
Mix type alliances
n
(% of total)
Multiple type alliances
n
(% of total)
All alliances
n
(% of total)

1.600000

1.130435

5**
(3.76%)
2
1
(0.75%)
1.358491
53
(39.85%)
1.333333
48**
(36.09%)
1.538462
26
(19.55%)
1.333333
6**
(4.51%)
1.40000
80
(60.15%)
1.383459
133
(100%)

25
(14.88%)
1.8
9
(5.36%)
1.415842
104**
(61.90%)
1.238095
42
(25.00%)
1.666667
18
(10.78%)
1.000000
4
(2.38%)
1.34375
64
(38.10%)
1.391566
168
(100%)

-1.0379

0.3366

NA

NA

0.36863

0.7132

-0.47015

0.6394

0.51874

0.6069

-0.46625

0.6574

-0.36074

0.7189

0.076173

0.9393

Note:
* denotes variable where the sample size was too small to conduct a Welch Two Sample T-test.
** denotes variables wherein certain strategic alliances were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete data.

An analysis of the differences in the number of alliance partners between Indian and Chinese
strategic alliances was done using the Welch Two-sample T-tests as presented in Table 2. None of
the variables yielded statistically significant results, indicating that there is no measurable
difference in the number of alliance partners between Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical strategic
alliances. In Table 2, the average number of alliance partners is compared for all single type
alliances which include “Marketing alliances”, “manufacturing alliances”, “licensing alliances”,
“research and development alliances”, “retail and wholesale services alliances”, “health and
medical services alliances”, “other alliances”, “single type alliances” across both countries. The
table also includes compares the average economic distance for all multiple type alliances- “two

39

type alliances”, “three type alliances”, “mix type alliances”, “multiple alliances”- and “all
alliances” for both India and China. However, licensing alliances, retail and wholesale services
alliances and other alliances have only 2 alliance partners bilaterally. Hence, a t-test could not be
performed for these variables.
Table 2: Welch Two Sample T-test analyzing alliance type by the variable “Number of Alliance
Partners”
Number of Alliance Partners
Alliance Type
India
China
T
p-value
Marketing alliances
2
2
1.07
0.3025
n
2
1
(% of total)
(1.46%)
(0.59%)
Licensing alliances*
2
2
NA
NA
n
3
5
(% of total)
(2.19%)
(2.94%)
Manufacturing alliances
2.206897
2.131579
-0.70505
0.4842
n
29
38
(% of total)
(21.17%)
(22.35%)
R&D alliances
2.363636
2.173913
-0.50931
0.6206
n
11
23
(% of total)
(8.03%)
(13.53%)
Retail and Wholesale
2
2
NA
NA
Services alliances*
n
3
4
(% of total)
(2.19%)
(2.35%)
Health and Medical Services 2.166667
2.000000
-1
0.3632
alliances
n
6
25
(% of total)
(4.38%)
(14.71%)
Other alliances*
2.000000
2.000000
NA
NA
n
1
10
(% of total)
(0.73%)
(5.88%)
Single type alliances
2.200000
2.084906
-1.2545
0.2142
n
55
106
(% of total)
(40.15%)
(62.35%)
Two type alliances
2.102041
2.166667
0.64813
0.5194
n
49
42
(% of total)
(35.77%)
(24.71%)
Three type alliances
2.038462
2.277778
1.3196
0.203
n
26
18
(% of total)
(18.98%)
(10.59%)
Mix type alliances
2.0
2.5
1
0.391
40

n
(% of total)
Multiple type alliances
n
(% of total)
All alliances
n (% of total)

7
(5.11%)
2.073171
82
(59.85%)
2.124088
137
(100%)

4
(2.35%)
2.218750
64
(37.65%)
2.135294
170
(100%)

1.679

0.09712

0.21179

0.8324

Note: *denotes variable where the sample size was too small to conduct a Welch Two-Sample T-test.

An analysis of the differences in the cross nationality across Indian and Chinese strategic alliances
was done using the Fisher’s Exact tests as presented in Tables 3-13. None of the variables yielded
statistically significant results, indicating that there is no measurable difference in the proportion
of cross-national strategic alliances between the Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical industries.
Tables 3,4,5,6,7,8 present the results of comparing the proportion of cross-national marketing
alliances, licensing alliances, manufacturing alliances, research and development alliances, health
and medical services alliances, and other alliances respectively. Table 9 shows the results of
comparing the cross-nationality of single type alliances bilaterally. Tables 10, 11, and 12 present
the results of comparing the proportion of cross-national two type alliances, three type alliances,
and multiple type alliances. Table 13 summarizes the results of the cross nationality of all alliances
for both countries.

However, a Fisher’s Exact test was not performed on mix type alliances and retail and wholesale
services alliances since all the strategic alliances for both categories recorded were cross-national.

Table 3: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “marketing alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
1
1
2
66.67%
Total (%)
33.33%
33.33%
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Row (%)
Column (%)
China
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

50.00%
50.00%
1

50.00%
100.00%
0

33.33%
100.00%
50.00%
2
66.67%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
1
33.33%

2
33.33%

3
P value = 1

Table 4: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “licensing alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
2
1
3
37.50%
Total (%)
25.00%
12.50%
Row (%)
66.67%
33.33%
Column (%)
33.33%
50.00%
China
4
1
5
62.50%
Total (%)
50.00%
12.50%
Row (%)
80.00%
20.00%
Column (%)
66.67%
50.00%
Total
6
2
8
75.00%
25.00%
P value = 1
Table 5: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “manufacturing alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
22
6
28
43.08%
Total (%)
33.85%
9.23%
Row (%)
78.57%
21.43%
Column (%)
42.31%
46.15%
China
30
7
37
66.03%
Total (%)
46.15%
10.77%
Row (%)
81.08%
18.92%
Column (%)
57.69%
53.85%
Total
52
13
65
85.26%
14.74%
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P value = 1
Table 6: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “research and development alliances” by the variable
“cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
11
0
11
32.35%
Total (%)
32.35%
0.00%
Row (%)
100.00%
0.00%
Column (%)
33.33%
0.00%
China
22
1
23
67.65%
Total (%)
64.71%
2.94%
Row (%)
95.65%
4.35%
Column (%)
66.67%
100.00%
Total
33
1
34
97.06%
2.94%
P value = 1
Table 7: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “health and medical services alliances” by the variable
“cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
4
1
5
33.97%
Total (%)
13.79%
3.45%
Row (%)
80.00%
20.00%
Column (%)
16.67%
20.00%
China
20
4
24
66.03%
Total (%)
68.97%
13.79%
Row (%)
83.33%
16.67%
Column (%)
83.33%
80.00%
Total
24
5
29
85.26%
14.74%
P value = 1
Table 8: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “other alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
1
0
1
33.97%
Total (%)
9.09%
0.00%
43

Row (%)
Column (%)
China
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

100.00%
10.00%
9

0.00%
0.00%
1

81.82%
90.00%
90.00%
10
85.26%

9.09%
10.00%
100.00%
1
14.74%

10
66.03%

11
P value = 1

Table 9: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “single alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
44
9
53
33.97%
Total (%)
28.21%
5.77%
Row (%)
83.02%
16.98%
Column (%)
33.08%
39.13%
China
89
14
23
66.03%
Total (%)
57.05%
8.97%
Row (%)
86.41%
13.59%
Column (%)
66.92%
60.87%
Total
133
23
156
85.26%
14.74%
P value = 0.6356
Table 10: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “two type alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
41
7
48
53.33%
Total (%)
45.56%
7.78%
Row (%)
85.42%
14.58%
Column (%)
52.56%
58.33%
China
37
5
42
46.67%
Total (%)
41.11%
5.56%
Row (%)
88.10%
11.90%
Column (%)
47.44%
41.67%
Total
78
12
90
86.67%
13.33%

44

P value = 0.765
Table 11: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “three type alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
24
2
26
59.09%
Total (%)
54.55%
4.55%
Row (%)
92.31%
7.69%
Column (%)
57.14%
100.00%
China
18
0
18
40.91%
Total (%)
40.91%
0.00%
Row (%)
100.00%
0.00%
Column (%)
42.86%
0.00%
Total
42
2
44
95.45%
4.55%
P value = 0.5053
Table 12: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “multiple type alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
71
9
80
55.56%
Total (%)
49.31%
6.25%
Row (%)
88.75%
11.25%
Column (%)
54.62%
64.29%
China
59
5
64
44.44%
Total (%)
40.97%
3.47%
Row (%)
92.19%
7.81%
Column (%)
45.38%
35.71%
Total
130
14
144
90.28%
9.72%
P value = 0.5788
Table 13: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “all alliances” by the variable “cross-national”
Cross National
Domestic
Total
Alliances
Alliances
India
115
18
133*
44.33%
Total (%)
38.33%
6.00%
Row (%)
86.47%
13.53%
Column (%)
45

China
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

43.73%
148

48.65%
19

49.33%
88.62%
56.27%
267
87.67%

6.33%
11.38%
51.35%
37
12.33%

167*
55.67%

300

p-value= 0.5995
Note: * denotes variables wherein certain strategic alliances were excluded from the analysis due to incomplete
data.

An analysis of the differences in the cross nationality across Indian and Chinese strategic alliances
was done using the Fisher’s Exact tests as presented in Tables 14-21. There is a statistically
significant difference in the average partner diversity between Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical
manufacturing alliances and single type alliances as seen in table 14 and table 17 respectively with
China having more alliances with heterogeneous partners. Tables 15 and 16 present the results of
comparing the average partner diversity between licensing alliances and health and medical
services alliances respectively. Tables 18,19 and 20 present the results of comparing the average
partner diversity between two type alliances, three type alliances, and multiple type alliances
respectively. There is also a statistically significant difference between all alliances in the Indian
and Chinese pharmaceutical industries, with China having more alliances with heterogeneous
partners overall as well as presented in Table 21.

However, Fisher’s Exact tests were not performed on marketing alliances, retail and wholesale
services alliances, research and development alliances, other alliances, and mix type alliances since
all the strategic alliances for these categories recorded had only homogenous partners.

Table 14: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “manufacturing alliances” by the variable “partner
diversity”
46

India
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
China
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

Homogenous
9

Heterogenous
20

13.43%
31.03%
75.00%
3

29.85%
68.97%
36.36%
35

4.48%
7.89%
25.00%
12
17.91%

52.24%
92.11%
63.64%
55
82.09%

29
43.28%

38
56.72%

67
p-value=
0.02293**

Table 15: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “licensing alliances” by the variable “partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
1
2
3
37.50%
Total (%)
12.50%
25.00%
Row (%)
33.33%
66.67%
Column (%)
100.00%
28.57%
China
0
5
5
62.50%
Total (%)
0.00%
62.50%
Row (%)
0.00%
100.00%
Column (%)
0.00%
71.43%
Total
1
7
8
12.50%
87.50%
p-value= 0.375
Table 16: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “health and medical services alliances” by the variable
“partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
1
5
6
19.35%
Total (%)
3.23%
16.13%
Row (%)
16.67%
83.33%
Column (%)
50.00%
17.24%
China
1
24
25
80.65%
Total (%)
3.23%
77.42%

47

Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

4.00%
50.00%
2
6.45%

96.00%
82.76%
29
93.55%

31
p-value= 0.3548

Table 17: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “single type alliances” by the variable “partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
11
44
55
34.16%
Total (%)
6.88%
27.50%
Row (%)
20.00%
80.00%
Column (%)
73.33%
30.34%
China
4
102
106
65.84%
Total (%)
2.50%
63.13%
Row (%)
3.81%
96.19%
Column (%)
26.67%
69.66%
Total
15
146
161
9.32%
90.68%
p-value=
0.001392**
Table 18: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “two type alliances” by the variable “partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
6
43
49
53.85%
Total (%)
6.59%
47.25%
Row (%)
12.24%
87.76%
Column (%)
54.55%
53.75%
China
5
37
42
46.15%
Total (%)
5.49%
40.66%
Row (%)
11.90%
88.10%
Column (%)
45.45%
46.25%
Total
11
80
91
12.09%
87.91%
p-value= 1
Table 19: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “three type alliances” by the variable “partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
1
25
26
59.09%

48

Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
China
Total (%)
Row (%)
Column (%)
Total

2.27%
3.85%
33.33%
2

56.82%
96.15%
60.98%
16

4.55%
11.11%
66.67%
3
6.82%

36.36%
88.89%
39.02%
41
93.18%

18
40.91%

44
p-value= 0.5583

Table 20: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “multiple type alliances” by the variable “partner
diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
7
75
82
56.16%
Total (%)
4.79%
51.37%
Row (%)
8.54%
91.46%
Column (%)
50.00%
56.82%
China
7
57
64
43.84%
Total (%)
4.79%
39.04%
Row (%)
10.94%
89.06%
Column (%)
50.00%
43.18%
Total
14
132
146
9.59%
90.41%
p-value= 0.7783
Table 21: Fisher’s Exact test analyzing “all alliances” by the variable “partner diversity”
Homogenous
Heterogenous
India
18
119
137
44.63%
Total (%)
5.86%
38.76%
Row (%)
13.14%
86.86%
Column (%)
62.07%
42.81%
China
11
159
170
55.37%
Total (%)
3.58%
51.79%
Row (%)
6.47%
93.53%
Column (%)
37.93%
57.19%
Total
29
278
307
9.45%
90.55%
49

p-value=
0.05175**
Given the importance of the type of alliance in the categorization of the alliance variable, a
Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction analyzing “Alliance Type” by country
was done to understand the difference between the proportion of single type alliances and multiple
type alliances. This yielded a statistically significant result with India engaging in more multiple
type alliances than China as shown in table 22.
Table 22: Pearson's Chi-squared test with Yates' continuity correction analyzing “Alliance Type”
by country
India
China
Total
Single type
55
106
161
alliances
52.44%
Total (%)
17.92%
34.53%
Row (%)
34.16%
65.84%
Column (%)
40.15%
62.35%
Multiple type
82
64
146
alliances
47.56%
Total (%)
26.71%
20.85%
Row (%)
56.16%
43.84%
Column (%)
59.85%
37.65%
Total
137
170
307
44.63%
55.37%
X-squared= 14.123
p-value= 0.0001712**
6. Discussion
Broadly speaking, the changes in strategic alliances across marketing, licensing, manufacturing,
retail and wholesale services, health and medical services, research and development for the Indian
and Chinese pharmaceutical industry over the last three decades look symmetrical. The domestic
implementation of TRIPS in either country did not seem to have a drastic impact on any category
of strategic alliances which aligns with the similar process that both countries followed in changing
their legislation. India made full use of the transition period granted by WTO to developing
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countries (Chadha 2009). China, on the other hand, had passed the first amendment to its Patent
Law on 1 January 1993. This amendment mirrored one of the biggest changes enforced by TRIPS,
which is granting product patent protection for pharmaceutical compounds to be used as active
ingredients for a period of 20 years. Thus, when the TRIPS was actually implemented in the
country, Chinese firms were already accustomed to the change in terms of stronger intellectual
property rights (Li 2008). This is one possibility why TRIPS does not seem to be impactful in
influencing the trend of strategic alliances in either country.

Notably, China has more strategic alliances than India over a shorter time. China has 170 strategic
alliances from 1996 to 2019 while India has 137 alliances from 1990 to 2019, a difference of 43
alliances over 6 fewer years than India. In conjunction with the Pearson's Chi-squared test
analyzing the type of alliance with the country as shown in table 22 which states that China engages
in a statistically significant increased proportion of single type alliances (62.35%) indicates that
Indian firms may be more efficient in terms of using the same number or fewer pharmaceutical
strategic alliances to achieve the same goals that Chinese firms target through an increased number
of alliances which have only one motivation. Chinese firms focusing on more single-type alliances
may also be correlated to the partner diversity within the alliance. A statistically significant
proportion of all Chinese alliances are heterogenous (57.19%) which means that the firms in the
alliance belong to different industries. It is possible that firms with the same industry are more
efficient in organizational learning and thus may be able to achieve more than an alliance with
partners in diverse industries. Other scholars have also proposed that alliances between firms
within the same industries may create favorable contexts, particularly for inter-organizational
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learning (Cegarra-Navarro 2005; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell 2002; Khanna, Gulati and
Nohria 1998).

The greater proportion of heterogeneous firms within Chinese strategic alliances may also be
attributed to the different business environments in the two countries. Firms within China remain
largely state-owned; state ownership may facilitate more chances for collaboration. It would follow
that then even single type Chinese alliances have heterogenous partners which is proven by the
analysis in table 17. It shows that a statistically significant greater proportion (96.19%) of Chinese
single type alliances is heterogeneous as compared to Indian single type alliances. On a more
granular breakdown with the single type alliances, the same results are replicated with statistical
significance for manufacturing alliances only with greater heterogeneity in Chinese alliances.
Hence, state capitalism may directly or indirectly support strategic alliances amongst diverse
industries. This builds on the results of Dacin, Hitt, and Levitas’s study on the difference between
partner selection criteria for successful international alliances for US and Korean firms. Like
China, Korea is state-run and given its communitarian culture and the need to effectively manage
close ties with government entities, managers in Korea have had to develop the requisite partnering
skills needed to form successful collaborative ventures. These managers had developed internal
capabilities for networking through their linkages to the system of state government. The top two
criteria used by Korean executables were technical capabilities which is defined as the “ability to
develop a new process or product technologies” and industry attractiveness (1997). Since several
authors have emphasized how a strategic alliance with diverse industry partners boosts innovation
outcomes given that the origin of innovation often lies outside the base industry, it follows that
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managers seeking innovation may prefer heterogeneous strategic alliances (Kotabe and Swan
1995; Powell, Koput and Smith-Doerr 1996).

Broadly speaking, both countries engage with cross-national alliances in a greater proportion with
86.47% of Chinese alliances being cross alliances, similar to 88.62% for Indian strategic alliances.
Moreover, the average number of alliance partners for all alliances was 2.124088 and
2.135294 for India and China respectively. This makes sense given that the dataset includes only
completed alliances and excludes terminated alliances; strategic alliances with 2 partners are more
stable and have lower chances of failure (Oxley 1997; Park and Russo 1996). The average number
of alliance partners for all single-type alliances in India and China respectively is 2.200000 and
2.084906. This is similar to the average number of alliance partners for all multiple type alliances
in India and China (2.07317 and 2.218750 respectively). This is interesting because it indicates
that the alliances that belong to multiple types or are multi-purpose in both countries do not achieve
their broader mandate by increasing the average number of partners as compared to single-type
alliances. It is possible that this is done by a more specific and curated screening of factors in the
partner selection process in strategic alliances in India than in China. Dong and Glaister in their
study on motives and partner selection criteria in Chinese strategic alliances corroborate these
results by finding that task-related selection criteria are more specific to alliance formation whereas
partner-related selection criteria are more general in nature (2006).

What would add even more significance to these results is observing these four structural
dimensions- economic distance, number of alliance partners, cross-nationality, and partner
diversity in high performing versus low-performance alliances to better understand their positive
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or negative impact on strategic alliances. Furthermore, this study’s observations have limitations
given the small sample size, especially for certain alliance type categories like marketing alliances
where there are only two recorded alliances in India and one for China. This study is limited to the
Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical industries and can be generalized to other similar cultural
contexts only to a certain extent. Future research should consider the same parameters to fully
generalize the results to other industries.
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